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fied by a valid factor unrelated to ec0nomic protectionism." Id. at 2024
(quoting New Energy Co. ofIndiana v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988».
Michigan and St. Clair County claimed
that the amendments were not economically motivated~ rather, they were
intended to protect the health and safety
ofthe citizens. ForlGratiol, 112 S. Ct.
at 2026. The Court explained that
"because [the] provisions unambiguously discriminate against interstate
commerce, the State bears the burden
of proving that they further health and
safety concerns that cannot be adequately served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives." Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct.
at 2027. In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131 (1986), the Court upheld Maine's
ban on the importation of live baitfish
because of parasites and other problems the nonnative baitfish posed. The
Court concluded that Michigan's Waste
Import Restrictions violated the Commerce Clause because the amendments
failed to present a reason, apart from
origin, why solid waste from outside
the county should be treated differently from solid waste from inside the
county. Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct. at
2027-28.
The Court stressed that even if a
legitimate goal were sought, illegitimate means to achieve that goal may
not be used. Id at 2027. Michiganand
St. Clair County asserted that the restrictions were needed to allow counties to adequately plan for the safe
disposal offuture waste. Fort Gratiot,
112 S. Ct. at 2027. The Court acknowledged that "although accurate
forecasts may be an indispensable part
ofa comprehensive waste disposal plan,
Michigan could attain that objective
without discriminating between in- and
out-of-state waste." Id at 2027.
In his dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the case should
be remanded for consideration of
whether the SWMA amendments were
based upon legitimate local health and
safetyconcerns.Id. at2028. TheChief
Justice asserted that in light of the
problems associated with the disposal

of waste, Michigan was taking reasonable measures to protect its citizens and
was not constructing a form of ec0nomic protectionism. Id at 2028-29.
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared, "the
Cou rt today penalizes the State ofMichigan for what to all appearances are its
good-faith efforts, in tum encouraging
each State to ignore the waste problem
in the hope that another will pick up the
slack." Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at
2031.
In Fori Gratiol, the Court imposed
a strict standard against the implementation of discriminatory waste import
laws. The Court will strike down any
statute that interferes with interstate
commerce, unless a state can show that
the restrictions were nece~sary to protect its citizens and that there were no
less discriminatory options. In order
for states or counties to enforce a waste
management plan, the area that is to be
protected must be held to the same
standards that are imposed upon other
counties and states.
- Carol Nakhuda Cohen
In re Criminal Investigation No. Jf
242Q: ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE

RECORDS NOT PRIVILEGED
FROM SUBPOENA.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
recently held that requiring an attorney
to disclose jury records ofthe fees paid
by two former clients to a grand jury did
not violate the attorney-client privilege. In re Criminal Investigation No.
Jl242Q, 326 Md. 1, 602 A.2d 1220
(1992). The court emphasized that
although Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility, governing confidentiality, is broader than the
attorney-client privilege rule in Maryland, it does not provide an absolute
shield to prevent this information from
being subpoenaed.
As part of an investigation of known
or suspected narcotics traffickers, the
state routinely sought evidence of violations of the state income tax laws.
The growing trend in narcotics investigation was to seek evidence of expenditures of large sums of money, includ-

ing attorney's fees, as a means of
interpolating the net worth of a suspect. For this reason, the Grand Jury
for Anne Arundel County issued a
subpoena duces tecum to attorney William H. Murphy, Jr. for the fee records
of two of his former clients.
In a motion to quash the subpoena,
Mr. Murphy pleaded that he had expressly promised his clients that all
information about fees "would be personal, privileged, and confidential
because of, among other things, the
growing practice of prosecutors nationwide to use such information to
establish violations of the narcotics
laws .... " Id. at 6,602 A.2dat 1222.
He argued that to reveal the information in light of his client's express
request that he not, was a breach of
confidentiality .
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County granted the motion to quash
the subpoena on the grounds that ''the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct have 'enlarged the general principle of confidentiality. '" Id. at 3,602
A.2d at 1221. On behalf of the grand
jury, the State filed an appeal to the
court of special appeals. Before the
intermediate court heard the case, however, the Court of Appeals of Mary. land granted certiorari and reversed
the circuit court's decision, holding
that Rule 1.6 and the judicial application of the attorney-client privilege
rule are distinct concepts. The court
found that Rule 1.6 does not enlarge
the attorney-client privilege rule in
Maryland.
The court of appeals began by analyzing Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Citing the
prefatory material to the Rules, which
stated: "Moreover, these Rules are not
intended to govern or affect judicial
application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege, the court
rejected the lower court's contention
that the adoption of this rule by the
Maryland legislature affectively expanded the attorney-client privilege."
Id at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221 (quoting
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
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Rule 1.6). The attorney-client privilege, which "applies in judicial and
other proceedings in which a lawyer
may be called as a witness or otherwise
required to produce evidence concerning aclientL]" was distinguished from
client-lawyer confidentiality, which
"applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the
lawyer through compulsion of law."
Id at 5, 602 A.2d at 1222. The court
concluded that because Rule 1.6 applied in all situations, except where the
protected information was requested
under compulsion of law, the rule of
confidentiality was broader in scope.
Applying the attorney-client privilege to the instant case, the court found
that the information sought was beyond the scope of the privilege. The
client's explicit request that information be kept confidential did not create
a privilege under the law. While the
court acknowledged that the attorneyclient privilege is necessary to our legal system in order to assure that clients do not hesitate to seek legal advice
or to confide in their lawyers, the court
qualified this observation by noting
that "[t]he privilege is not absolute; it
does not restrict disclosure of every
aspect of what occurs between the attorney and the client." Id. at 11, 602
A.2d at 1225.
The court noted that a clear majority of jurisdictions have held that requiring disclosure of attorney's fees
did not violate the attorney-client privilege. Attorney's fees were an expected
part of the relationship and to some
extent the client was involved with the
attorney in an arms-length transaction
that was collateral to the privileged
relationship. Id. at 7, 602 A.2d at
1223.
The court described three general
exceptions to the rule requiring disclosure of attorney's fees. The "legal
advice" exception would apply where
the "disclosure of the information
would implicate the client in the very
matter for which legal advice was
sought in the first case." Id. at 7,602
A.2dat 1223 (quotingIn re GrandJury
26

Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 695 F.2d
363 (9th Cir. 1982». Another exception called the "last link" had been
applied where only the client's identity
was sought. The "communication exception" had been applied when "disclosure of the client's identity or the
existence of a fee arrangement would
reveal information that is tantamount
to a confidential professional communication." Id at 9, 602 A.2d at 1224.
The court, however, concluded that
these exceptions were "ill-defined and
overlapping" and in any case, distinguishable from the case. Id. at 7, 602
A.2d at 1223.
Judge Bell, in the lone dissent,
agreed with the majority's interpretation of Rule 1.6, as well as with the
conclusion that the instant case did not
fall under the recognized exceptions
where the attorney-client privilege
would be implicated. He dissented,
nonetheless, because he found the rationale presented for the majority's
holding that fee information was not
'confidential unpersuasive. Id. at 16,
602 A.2d at 1227. Payment of
attorney's fees, he contended, was at
the core rather than collateral to the
attorney-client relationship and should,
therefore, be privileged. Id. at 19,602
A.2d at 1229.
By allowing the subpoena of attorney fee records, the court has given
prosecutor another avenue for collecting evidence in the zealous hunt for
drug traffickers. Presumably evidence
offees paid to an attorney would not be
the only available evidence to establish the net worth of a suspect. More
importantly, knowing that his
attorney's fee records are likely to be
subpoenaed in any future action against
him, an individual accused of a crime
involving large sums of money will
think twice before he establishes this
record. Allowing ready access to fee
records may at some point conflict
with Maryland's clear public policy of
encouraging accused citizens to seek
legal assistance without fear oflack of
confidentiality.
- Dianne Moorehead Hughes

UnitedStatesDep'tofEnergyv. Ohio:
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PROTECTED DEP'T FROM CIVIL
PENALTIES FOR PAST VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION RECOVERY ACT.
In United States Dep 't ofEnergy v.
Ohio, 112 S. Ct 1627 (1992), the United
States Supreme Court held that the
Department of Energy ("DOE'') is exempt from state and federal civil penalties for past violations ofthe Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA'').
The Court held that because Congress
did not expressly waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity concerning past violations of the CWA
and the RCRA, the federal government
may only be liable for coercive fines
which prospectively modify behavior.
In 1986, the State of Ohio sued the
DOE for improperly disposing ofhazardous wastes from its uranium processing plant in violation ofthe CWA
and the RCRA. Relying on the federal
facilities and citizen suit sections ofthe
CWA and the RCRA, Ohio pursued
both state and federal civil penalties
for the DOE's past violations of these
laws. The federal facilities sections
govern the extent to which federal operations are subject to the CWA and
RCRA statutes. The citizen suit sections allow private individuals to enforce the CWA and RCRA. Ohio
brought suit in the United States District Court for Ohio, which held that
the CWA and the RCRA federal facilities and citizen suit sections waived
federal sovereign immunity for civil
penalties. Holding that Congress
waived immunity in all but the RCRA
federal facilities section, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affmned in part and reversed in
part. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether
Congress waived immunity for punitive fines in the CWA and the RCRA.
The Court began its analysis by
stating the common rule "that any
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